Power in a riskier climate
Floods are no longer an event in Pakistan. They are a season. In August 2022, floodwater covered 35 per cent of Sindh, an area where an estimated 18.6 million people lived. Twelve years earlier, the 2010 floods had run the length of the Indus. Between the floods come summers when temperatures in upper Sindh pass 50°C and the smog that settles over Punjab’s cities each winter. Families have been adjusting to these conditions for years, often at their own expense.
Pakistan has contributed little to global warming. By 2024, its share of all the carbon dioxide the world had emitted from fossil fuels and industry was about 0.3 per cent. After the 2022 floods, Pakistan helped secure agreement at COP27 on a fund for loss and damage. Countries that have contributed most to warming owe support to people here who have already lost homes and harvests to a changing climate.
The warming itself is quieter than the floods. In a reconstruction of Pakistan’s weather, summer nights were on average 0.4°C warmer between May and September in 2011–25 than in 1981–2010. Daytime highs over those months barely changed. The shorter records from 19 weather stations broadly support that finding. A heat warning based on the afternoon maximum alone can miss how little relief comes after sunset.
After the flood follows the harvest in the places where satellites kept finding water through the autumn of 2022. In Jaffarabad, the flood covered 95 per cent of the district in the last week of August. The following year, Jaffarabad and neighbouring Sohbatpur together grew a little more rice than their average in the three years before the floods. Yet when the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization surveyed rural households in Jaffarabad more than a year after the flood peak, 77 per cent were moderately or severely food insecure. The harvest figures tell us how much rice the two districts grew. The survey tells us how many families in Jaffarabad still struggled to eat.
Farmers in Punjab’s cotton belt have decisions to make before every sowing. In Pakpattan, cotton covered 52,000 hectares in 2000–01 and just 4,500 in 2024–25. Rice and maize expanded over the same years. Across the belt, cotton yields have tended to be lower in wetter summers. How much that weighed in planting decisions alongside pests, seed and prices is harder to establish. A farmer has to decide what to sow. The canal and the groundwater on which that decision depends are shared. We can trace the change in planting district by district. How much water the new mix of crops draws from canals and wells is a question the figures leave open.
Our Big Read, Pakistan’s solar boom meets its power bill, follows households and farms adjusting to a different pressure. Registered rooftop solar systems cluster in Punjab and Islamabad, where the distribution companies generally collect their bills in full and cut supply less often. The census finds solar lighting common in parts of Balochistan, upper Sindh and the merged districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa where villages had limited electricity even before the boom. Changing what the grid pays for surplus power matters to a family with electricity to sell. It does little for a village waiting for a dependable supply. By 2024–25, the ten state distribution companies were selling 11 per cent less electricity than three years earlier. The bill for keeping power plants available still came to Rs 1.8 trillion, much of it under contracts signed before the solar boom.
What a place supplies to the rest of the country can tell us remarkably little about what its people receive. I’m grateful to Sana Zaman Butt and Ghufran Khalid for their account of Balochistan’s resource wealth. The province produces about a fifth of Pakistan’s natural gas. Outside Quetta, about one household in twelve said it cooked mainly with gas in the 2023 census. Near the Zain Koh–Loti field in Dera Bugti, a resident told Adaad how families in his settlement had laid their own connections to the main pipeline. They pay to mend the pipes when they break. In Pir Koh, another resident said his family buys firewood to cook. This is the district that has supplied Pakistan with gas since the 1950s.
Our comparison of Karachi and Lahore sets estimates of emissions alongside readings from air quality monitors. In 2024, Karachi emitted an estimated 2.9 kilograms of fine particles per resident, compared with 2.3 in Lahore. Yet over 350 days of monitoring in 2025–26, fine-particle levels in the air were in the unhealthy range or worse on 209 days in Lahore and 85 in Karachi.
Our district profiles draw on two satellite records. In Jaffarabad, floodwater still covered 8 per cent of the district in mid-January 2023. In North Waziristan, most of the recorded tree-cover loss occurred between 2004 and 2011. Our Method Notebook takes readers to a creek in the Indus delta, where mud, water and young trees can all fall within a single pixel. Two maps agree that the mangroves have spread. By 2020 one put their extent at nearly twice the other’s estimate.
In our reporting on the 2022 floods, we traced 21 rural drainage and flood-protection schemes in Sindh’s Annual Development Programme. Umerkot, where water covered about a quarter of the district at the peak, had the largest sum approved per resident among the districts we examined. In Shikarpur, more than nine-tenths of the district went under water. None of the 21 schemes was there.
Decisions about where we build and how we share water reach well beyond any one farm or village. The people whose homes and livelihoods are at stake should have a say in those choices. When we decide where to invest, we should start with the communities most exposed and least able to afford another loss.
The climate Pakistan farms and builds in has already changed, largely because of emissions beyond our borders. The task of adapting to it falls to us and, above all, to our governments.
18 November 2026